Comment: Doe v. Woodard and its Impact on the Circuit Split Surrounding Social Workers’ Inspections of Suspected Victims of Child Abuse by Workman, Mary Kate
Child and Family Law Journal 
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 5 
5-2021 
Comment: Doe v. Woodard and its Impact on the Circuit Split 
Surrounding Social Workers’ Inspections of Suspected Victims of 
Child Abuse 
Mary Kate Workman 
University of Kansas School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Family Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, Juvenile Law 
Commons, and the Other Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Workman, Mary Kate (2021) "Comment: Doe v. Woodard and its Impact on the Circuit Split Surrounding 
Social Workers’ Inspections of Suspected Victims of Child Abuse," Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 9 : 
Iss. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol9/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Child and Family Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law. 
Comment: Doe v. Woodard and its Impact on the Circuit Split Surrounding Social 
Workers’ Inspections of Suspected Victims of Child Abuse 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D., University of Kansas School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Melanie DeRousse, Sasha 
Raab, and Maddie Level for their assistance and input, and Professor Kyle Velte for her guidance in 
navigating the publication process. 
This article is available in Child and Family Law Journal: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol9/iss1/5 
 
  104
Comment: Doe v. Woodard and its Impact on the 
Circuit Split Surrounding Social Workers’ 
Inspections of Suspected Victims of Child Abuse 
Mary Kate Workman* 
 
 
I.  Introduction ......................................................................... 105 
II. Background ......................................................................... 107 
A. The Fourth Amendment and its Exceptions ....................... 107 
B. The Special Needs Doctrine ................................................ 108 
1. History and Evolution of the Special Needs Doctrine ..... 108 
2. Special Needs Doctrine Tests and Application ............... 110 
C. The Circuit Split ................................................................... 111 
D. Doe v. Woodard .................................................................. 114 
III. Analysis............................................................................... 118 
A. The Special Needs Doctrine is too Complex and Ambiguous 
to Allow for Consistent Application ........................................ 118 
B. The Potential Consequences for Searches of Suspected 
Victims of Child Abuse are Severe so Full Due Process Should be 
Afforded .................................................................................. 120 
C. The Special Needs Doctrine Could Be Abused .................... 124 
D. Proposed Federal Legislation ............................................. 125 




                                                                                                             
 *  J.D., University of Kansas School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor 
Melanie DeRousse, Sasha Raab, and Maddie Level for their assistance and input, and 
Professor Kyle Velte for her guidance in navigating the publication process.  
2021] Comment: Doe v. Woodard  105 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, an anonymous source reported possible signs of 
abuse on four-year-old I.B.’s body, including bruised knees and small 
cuts.1 This prompted an investigation by the Department of Human 
Services through caseworker April Woodard.2 Despite only being aware 
of bruised knees and small cuts on I.B.’s stomach, Woodard fully 
undressed and photographed I.B.’s private areas without obtaining a 
warrant or parental consent.3 I.B.’s parents sued, claiming this was an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.4 However, I.B. and 
her family lost this lawsuit and never recovered because the law was 
unclear about whether a warrant was required or whether the special 
needs doctrine applied.5 This uncertainty shielded Woodard from liability 
under qualified immunity.6 
To protect children like I.B. from an invasion of privacy through 
searches like this, the law needs to clearly define when a warrant is 
required to conduct a strip search of suspected victims of child abuse. 
This Comment focuses on the special needs doctrine, one of the 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and the 
circuit split over its application. The Tenth Circuit should follow the 
growing trend in the circuit split to block the special needs doctrine from 
applying to searches of suspected victims of child abuse for three 
reasons: (1) the tests used to determine if the special needs doctrine 
applies are ambiguous and unclear, creating uncertainty in the law; (2) 
the potential consequences resulting from warrantless searches are 
severe, so all due process should be afforded; and (3) the special needs 
doctrine could be abused. 
Doe v. Woodard is a significant case because it emphasizes the 
growing circuit split and the uncertainty social workers face when 
deciding whether to obtain a warrant.7 The Tenth Circuit recognized this 
uncertainty in the law and correctly determined that the law was not 
“clearly established.”8 When the law is not clearly defined, government 
employees will not be held liable for actions they did not realize were 
                                                                                                             
 1 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 1285–86. 
 4 Id. at 1286. 
 5 Id. at 1288 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Fourth Amendment 
claims for failing to show that a warrant was clearly required). 
 6 Id. at 1289–90. 
 7 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 8 Id. at 1294. 
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unlawful.9 Therefore, victims of invasive searches, like I.B., cannot 
recover. 
Woodard’s conduct was not an isolated event, but rather, 
unwarranted bodily inspections of children are taking place every day. 
With millions of searches taking place, social workers need to be able to 
conduct their business knowing whether they are required to obtain a 
warrant.  In 2017, child protection agencies in the U.S. received 2.4 
million reports of alleged child abuse.10  However, of those 2.4 million 
reports, 1.8 million were screened out as unfounded cases.11 When 
narrowing the focus to one state, Kansas, reports show Child Protective 
Services receives over two-hundred reports a day, with sixty-three 
percent meeting the criteria to warrant an investigation.12 As of March 
2018, abuse investigators in Kansas were working on twenty-one to 
twenty-six cases at a time, despite the Child Welfare League of 
America’s recommendation that caseworkers should maintain no more 
than twelve cases at a time.13 
With hefty caseloads, defining whether the search of a child’s body 
is a “special need,” which does not require obtaining a warrant, is a 
pivotal question needing a timely response.  However, policy and 
procedure manuals for caseworkers are often lengthy and dense, making 
it difficult for caseworkers to know proper search boundaries.14 For 
example, 91.1% of child abuse allegations in Kansas were found to be 
unsubstantiated after an investigation.15 This means that even if 91.1% of 
                                                                                                             
 9 Id. at 1289. 
 10 U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Serv’s., CHILD MALTREATMENT 6-10 (2017), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/cm2017.pdf. 
 11 Id. at 6-7 (“Reasons for screening out a referral vary by state policy, but may 
include one or more of the following: Does not concern child abuse and neglect; Does not 
contain enough information for a CPS response to occur; Response by another agency is 
deemed more appropriate; Children in the referral are the responsibility of another agency 
or jurisdiction (e.g., military installation or tribe); Children in the referral are older than 
18 years.”). 
 12 PPS Policy and Procedural Manual, KAN. DEP’T CHILDREN & FAM., (Jan. 1, 
2020), 
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/Documents/PPM_Forms/Policy_and_Procedure_Ma
nual.pdf.; Prevention and Prevention & Protection Services: Child Protective Services 
Reports, KAN. DEP’T FOR CHILDREN & FAM. (last visited Nov. 10, 2019), 
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/Pages/CPSReports.aspx. 
 13 Devon Fasbinder, FF12: DCF Child Welfare Investigators Face High Caseloads, 
KWCH12 (May 31, 2019), https://www.kwch.com/content/news/FF12-DCF-child-
welfare-investigators-face-high-caseloads-510678991.html. 
 14 See e.g., PPS Policy and Procedural Manual, supra note 12 (the Protection 
Services Policy and Procedural Manual for Kansas is 851 pages long and has not one 
mention of “strip search,” “undress,” or even “warrant.”). 
 15 Prevention and Prevention & Protection Services: Child Protective Services 
Reports, supra note 12. 
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the investigations prove no child abuse took place, then each of these 
children could have been subjected to invasive searches without proper 
guidance.  Perhaps the reason this number is so high is because, without 
clear legislative guidelines, caseworkers are searching every child, even 
those for whom the search may not be warranted at all. 
The structure of this Comment will proceed in three parts. Section 
II establishes the context of this issue including background about the 
Fourth Amendment, the special needs doctrine, and the dispositions of 
the courts in the circuit split. Section III is an analysis of the Woodard 
decision and why the special needs doctrine should not apply to searches 
of children who are suspected victims of child abuse. Section III 
concludes by outlining proposed legislation clarifying that the special 
needs doctrine should not apply to searches of suspected victims of child 
abuse. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the context of Doe v. Woodard and how it 
fits into the larger circuit split, this section outlines the Fourth 
Amendment and its exceptions, the special needs doctrine’s history and 
tests for application, and the disposition of each case in the circuit split. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and its Exceptions 
The Fourth Amendment creates a constitutional guarantee for 
“people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”16  Probable 
cause sufficient to issue a warrant requires “knowledge or reasonably 
trustworthy information of facts and circumstances.”17  Further, judges 
must take into account the “totality of the circumstances” when 
determining whether sufficient probable cause exists to issue a warrant.18 
However, “probable cause” is not clearly defined and there are no rigid 
boxes to check; rather, probable cause is a flexible term that leaves room 
for judicial discretion in issuing warrants.19 
To determine if a search or seizure is within the bounds of the 
Fourth Amendment, it must be reasonable.20 A warrantless search is 
                                                                                                             
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 17 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 18 Lauren Kobrick, I am Not Law Enforcement! Why the Special Needs Exception to 
the Fourth Amendment Should Apply to Caseworkers Investigating Allegations of Child 
Abuse, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1505, 1514 (Apr. 2017). 
 19 Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 603 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). 
 20 Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of 
the established exceptions.21 Among these exceptions are: (1) consent; 
(2) exigent circumstances; and (3) a special need.22 This Comment 
focuses exclusively on the special needs exception because it is the issue 
driving the circuit split. 
B. The Special Needs Doctrine 
The special needs doctrine is difficult to narrow down to one simple 
test in one defined set of circumstances. For this reason, it is helpful to 
understand the evolution of the special needs doctrine, the different tests 
used to determine whether the special needs doctrine has been correctly 
applied, and the various circumstances where the use of the special needs 
doctrine has been upheld. 
1. History and Evolution of the Special Needs Doctrine 
The seed for the special needs doctrine was first planted in Camara 
v. Municipal Court.23  In Camara, the plaintiff claimed a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when a municipal worker came to 
perform a housing code inspection without her consent, exigent 
circumstances, or a warrant.24  While the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
explicitly use the phrase “special need” to determine this exception, the 
Court acknowledged “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to 
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,”25 and lowered the 
probable cause standard for obtaining a warrant for a housing 
inspection.26 
However, it wasn’t until nearly two decades later that Justice 
Blackmun coined the phrase “special needs doctrine” in his 1985 
concurring opinion in N.J. v. T.L.O.27  In T.L.O., a high school principal 
suspected a student was smoking marijuana at school, and while on 
public school property, he searched the student’s bag without her 
consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant.28  When determining 
                                                                                                             
 21 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1508. 
 22 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 23 Camera v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 538 (“The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be 
sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of ‘probable 
cause’ required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search 
that is being sought.”) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting)). 
 27 N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 28 Id. at 328. 
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whether the search was reasonable, the majority used a balancing test to 
weigh the intrusiveness of the search against the government’s interest in 
conducting the search.29  In a 6–3 decision, the majority reasoned that 
this was a reasonable search because the school had a reasonable interest 
in preventing drug use at school and the search was not overly invasive.30 
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun emphasized that there was a 
“special need” for the principal to be able to act immediately to protect 
other school children from actions that could threaten their safety and the 
educational process itself.31 Therefore, the Court allowed for a 
warrantless search when there was a “special need,” thus creating an 
additional exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.32 
In 2001, the Court further developed the special needs doctrine in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston by emphasizing the importance of the 
primary purpose of the search.33  In this case, a hospital conducted drug 
tests on pregnant women without a warrant or consent and reported 
positive drug tests to the police.34 The Fourth Circuit found this testing 
admissible as a “special need” and upheld the constitutionality of this 
warrantless search.35  However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding this 
was an unreasonable search because the primary purpose of the search 
was to arrest pregnant women and force them into substance abuse 
treatment.36 The Court viewed this purpose as being too intertwined with 
law enforcement; therefore a warrant was required.37 
These three cases highlight the evolution of the special needs 
doctrine. Camara introduced the idea that sometimes the burden of 
obtaining a warrant outweighs the necessity of the search or seizure.38 
T.L.O. established the balancing test which weighs the intrusiveness of 
the search against the government’s interest.39 Ferguson established the 
use of the primary purpose test, which says if the primary purpose of the 
search furthers law enforcement actions, the special needs doctrine does 
not apply.40 While these cases are not an exhaustive history of the special 
needs doctrine, they highlight the general background of the doctrine and 
its applicable tests. 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. at 351. 
 30 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 31 Id. at 353. 
 32 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 33 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 34 Id. at 73. 
 35 Id. at 74. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 85-86. 
 38 Camera v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). 
 39 T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985). 
 40 Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 81–82 (2001). 
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2. Special Needs Doctrine Tests and Application 
Speaking broadly, a search or seizure falls within the special needs 
doctrine when a state actor’s need—beyond that of criminal law 
enforcement—necessitates an immediate search, but makes the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
impracticable or irrelevant.41 If there is entanglement with law 
enforcement, the special needs doctrine does not apply because there is 
“a bright line between law enforcement purposes and all other 
purposes.”42  Courts use the primary purpose test to determine whether 
there is enough entanglement with law enforcement to block the special 
needs doctrine’s application. If the primary purpose of the warrantless 
search is to “generate evidence for law enforcement purposes” then the 
special needs doctrine does not apply.43 The purpose of this bright-line 
rule is to prevent law enforcement officials from side-stepping the 
warrant requirement by collecting information through non-law 
enforcement individuals under the special needs doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined what qualifies as a 
“special need.”44  In situations where courts have upheld the application 
of the special needs doctrine, there is not much of a common thread 
between people or locations, making it difficult to pinpoint when and 
where this doctrine applies.45 For example, the Court has upheld this 
doctrine in hospitals, public schools, and state agencies;46 and it has 
applied to probationers, parolees, student-athletes, students participating 
in extracurricular activities, people working in highly regulated 
industries, and federal customs officials.47 This varied list of people and 
places does not make defining a “special need” much easier.  However, 
this case law affirms that there is significant room for advocacy to argue 
for or against a situation being a “special need.”48 
                                                                                                             
 41 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1519. 
 42 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child 
Protection Investigations, and the Need To Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs 
Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 383 (Dec. 2012) (quoting Justice Blackmun in T.L.O.) 
 43 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1509. 
 44 Id. at 1523. 
 45 See infra notes 46–48. 
 46 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1523. 
 47 Adam Pié, The Monster Under the Bed: The Imaginary Circuit Split and the 
Nightmares Created in the Special Needs Doctrine’s Application to Child Abuse, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 563, 573-74 (Mar. 2012). 
 48 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (applying the 
special needs doctrine to allow drug testing of student athletes); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831–32 (2002) (applying 
the special needs doctrine to allow searches of students involved in extracurricular 
activities); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–81 (2001) (holding the special needs 
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In the sense that a “special need” makes obtaining a warrant 
impracticable, applying the special needs doctrine requires that the 
subsequent search or seizure must still be reasonable to survive a 
constitutional challenge.  Courts use a balancing test to determine 
reasonableness.49  This test, as first used in T.L.O., balances the 
intrusiveness of the search against the state’s interest in conducting the 
search.50 Another standard used to determine reasonableness is the two-
fold inquiry established in O’Connor v. Ortega, which asked whether the 
search was: (1) “justified at its inception,” and (2) reasonably related to 
the circumstances for which the search was generated in the first place.51  
A search is “justified at its inception” if the state had “reasonable 
grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence.”52 Further, a 
search is reasonably related to the circumstances for which it was 
generated if the search is not “excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”53 
Essentially, the court balances an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy with the government’s interest in performing the 
search.54 It is important to note that the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a subjective interest; whereas the government’s 
interest in the search is an objective one. This further demonstrates the 
complexity of this rule and how courts can reach varying outcomes when 
applying the special needs doctrine. 
C. The Circuit Split 
Due to the complex nature of the special needs doctrine, there is 
currently a circuit split over whether the special needs doctrine applies 
when a caseworker searches a child’s body for indicia of abuse. Courts 
today are wrestling with whether qualified immunity applies; whether the 
law is “clearly established;” and most significantly, whether the special 
needs doctrine applies to searches of suspected victims of child abuse. To 
better understand how Doe v. Woodard fits into the split, this Section 
provides a brief overview of each court’s disposition on the special needs 
doctrine’s applicability. 
                                                                                                             
doctrine did not apply because the primary purpose was to collect information for law 
enforcement purposes); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 
2642–43 (2009) (holding the special needs doctrine did not apply because the scope of 
the search was too invasive in light of the purpose of the search). 
 49 N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985). 
 50 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–43; Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1520. 
 51 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1521 
 52 Pié, supra note 47, at 572. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Gupta-Kagan, surpa note 42, at 387. 
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The first two circuits to address this issue were the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuit Courts, which held that the special needs doctrine should 
apply.55 In Darryl v. Coler, the Seventh Circuit applied the special needs 
doctrine and employed the two-fold test of whether the search was 
“justified at its inception” and reasonable in its scope.56 While the 
Seventh Circuit found a warrant was not necessary, they still noted, “we 
are not convinced, on the basis of the record before us, that the [social 
worker guideline], as it now exists, ensures that the searches will always 
be reasonable.”57 Therefore, they found that the allegations of child 
abuse in the facts and circumstances of the current case constituted a 
“special need” allowing the search to take place without a warrant.58 
However, they also cautioned against a generalized holding that these 
searches will always be reasonable.59 
The Fourth Circuit in Wildauer v. Frederick County, was the next 
to address this matter and they issued a short opinion echoing the 
sentiment of Darryl.60 The court used the same balancing test and 
determined the government’s interest in protecting foster children 
outweighed the foster parent’s expectation of privacy.61 This opinion did 
not directly discuss the special needs doctrine, but applied the same 
balancing test and cited Darryl as its main authority on this point.62 
In contrast, subsequent cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuit Courts held that the special needs doctrine should not apply 
to caseworkers who conduct bodily examinations of suspected victims of 
child abuse.63 This shows that since the decision in Wildauer in 1993, 
                                                                                                             
 55  Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 
993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 56 Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 1986).  Coler consolidated two appeals 
cases. Id. at 894.  One involved eight families suing the Department of Child and Family 
Services for strip searching their children at school after anonymous reports of abuse or 
neglect without obtaining a warrant.  Id. at 896.  The second case also involved an 
anonymous report about abuse and neglect of elementary-aged children.  Id. at 905.  The 
caseworker visited the children at home and saw no signs of abuse or neglect, yet still 
conducted a strip search of the children the following day at school.  Id. at 906.  
 57 Id. at 905. 
 58 Id. at 901. 
 59 Id. at 904. 
 60 Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993). In Wildauer, 
social workers conducted in-home medical examinations of eleven foster children 
without first obtaining a warrant after noticing signs of child neglect during an earlier, 
unrelated home visit.  Id. at 371, 373. 
 61 Id. at 373. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. 
Soc. Serv.’s for Child. & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3rd Cir. 1989); Roe v. Tex. Dep’t. 
of Protective & Regul. Serv.’s, 299 F.3d 395, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2002); Calabretta v. Floyd, 
189 F.3d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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there has been a pattern of courts not applying the special needs doctrine 
to searches of this type.64 
The Third Circuit issued the first case which began the rift of what 
would later become a circuit split in Good v. Dauphin County Social 
Services for Children & Youth.  This case is different from Darryl and 
Wildauer because the search was conducted at the child’s home rather 
than at school.65  In Good, the Third Circuit held that when social 
workers examine children for signs of abuse, the special needs doctrine 
does not apply.66 Rather, a warrant should be obtained unless there is 
consent or exigent circumstances.67 
The Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s holding in 
Calabretta v. Floyd.68  Similar to Good, this case also involved a social 
worker coming to the alleged victim’s home and conducting a strip 
search.69  The Ninth Circuit held without consent or an emergency, a 
warrant must be obtained, otherwise the search is unconstitutional.70  The 
special needs doctrine is not listed as an exception to the warrant 
requirement in this circumstance. 
The Second Circuit in Tenenbaum v. Williams recognized the 
special needs doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement but 
declined to decide whether it applied when searching or seizing a 
suspected victim of child abuse.71 Instead, the focus was on whether 
there was an exigent circumstance.72  This case involved the suspected 
child being removed from school and taken to the hospital to be 
examined for signs of abuse at the request of the caseworker.73 The 
Second Circuit found that without parental consent or emergency 
                                                                                                             
 64 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1293 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 65 Good, 891 F.2d at 1087. In Good, a police officer and social services caseworker 
showed up after 10:00 PM at the Good home to forcefully conduct a strip search of 
seven-year-old Jochebed Good without first obtaining a warrant.  Id. at 1089–90. 
 66 Id. at 1903. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Calabretta,189 F.3d at 808. In Calabretta, a police officer and social worker 
entered the Calabretta home, despite parental protest and without obtaining a warrant 
first, and conducted strip searches of the children despite protesting from the children and 
their mother. Id. at 810–12. 
 69 Id. at 817. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 588–92. In Tenenbaum, a five-year-old child with elective mutism 
communicated at one point to her teacher she was being touched inappropriately, but 
when asked the same questions later by a caseworker, denied being touched 
inappropriately. Id. at 589–90.  The caseworker conducted a home search and found no 
evidence of abuse or neglect, yet the next day had the child taken to the hospital for a 
sexual assault exam without a warrant or parental consent.  Id. at 591. 
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circumstances, a warrant should have been obtained.74  In this case, the 
court emphasized the timing of the investigation and reasoned that there 
was sufficient time to obtain a warrant.75 
The last Circuit Court opinion in the split, up until Doe v. Woodard, 
is Roe v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services.76 Roe is 
the only case in the circuit split post-Ferguson, so the Fifth Circuit 
applied the primary purpose test and found that the caseworker’s actions 
were too intertwined with law enforcement, so a warrant should have 
been obtained.77 The Fifth Circuit went on to say that in order for a 
caseworker to perform a visual body and cavity search on a child they 
must obtain a warrant, parental consent, or act under exigent 
circumstances—none of which were present in this case.78  Notably, the 
Fifth Circuit did not list the special needs doctrine as one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
These cases establish a circuit split over whether caseworkers can 
perform visual body searches of suspected victims of child abuse without 
a warrant under the special needs exception. These cases stretched from 
1985 to 2002, yet this issue has been left largely unresolved. This 
confusion was brought to light again in January 2019, when the Tenth 
Circuit joined the split in Doe v. Woodard.79 
D. Doe v. Woodard 
Doe v. Woodard is a case about a four-year-old child, I.B., who was 
undressed and photographed by a caseworker inspecting her for signs of 
child abuse. To understand how this case furthers the circuit split, this 
Comment provides a general overview of the facts, claims, and holding 
of the Tenth Circuit. 
In December 2014, an anonymous source called the El Paso County 
Department of Human Services to report potential signs of abuse on 
I.B.’s body.80 The source identified these signs as “bumps on her face, a 
nickel-sized bruise on her neck, a small red mark on her lower back, two 
                                                                                                             
 74 Id. at 594. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 
2002).  In Roe, six-year-old Jackie was reported for showing signs of sexual abuse after 
touching herself and other six-year-olds inappropriately.  Id. at 398.  Following this 
report, a caseworker conducted a strip search and cavity search of Jackie, which included 
photographing her vagina and buttocks without first obtaining a warrant.  Id. at 399. 
 77 Id. at 407–08. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 80 Id. at 1285. 
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small cuts on her stomach, and bruised knees.”81 Department of Human 
Services caseworker, April Woodard, responded to the call by visiting 
I.B. at school, removing her from class, and taking her to the nurse’s 
office.82 Woodard removed I.B.’s clothing to visually inspect her body.83 
While I.B. was naked, Woodard took photos of I.B.’s back, stomach, and 
buttocks on her cell phone.84 At no time did Woodard have a warrant or 
parental consent to conduct the search, but she was acting under the 
“unwritten, but well-established county-wide policy” to conduct these 
visual inspections without obtaining parental consent or a court order.85 
The next day Woodard continued her investigation by conducting a 
home search.  Woodard spoke to I.B.’s mother who cooperated with the 
investigation.86 However, Woodard did not tell Ms. Doe she had already 
inspected and photographed I.B.’s body.87 Woodard closed the 
investigation of I.B. and reported the case as “unfounded.”88 It was not 
until after the case was closed that I.B. told her mother about being 
undressed and photographed at school by Woodard.  I.B. said, “she 
hoped she would not see Ms. Woodard again because ‘I don’t like it 
when she takes all my clothes off.’”89 
After hearing these statements from her daughter, Ms. Doe 
approached Woodard and asked about the search.90 At first, Woodard 
denied the allegations, but, two months later, she admitted she had 
undressed and photographed I.B. during her investigation.91 Woodard 
justified her search by telling Ms. Doe that child abuse investigations 
take priority over parental rights.92 Following this, the Does filed a 
section 1983 claim alleging a violation of I.B.’s Fourth Amendment 
Rights on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure, and a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation of the Does’ parental rights.93 This 
Comment will focus only on the Fourth Amendment claims. 
The Colorado District Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment 
claims, arguing Woodard was entitled to qualified immunity because the 
law was not so “clearly established” to “give [Woodard] fair warning 
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that the taking photographs of portions of I.B.’s unclothed body required 
a warrant.”94 Further, the district court held the Does’ complaint lacked 
sufficient allegations to show that, based on the special needs doctrine, 
the search was “unjustified at its inception” or “improper in scope.”95 
The Does appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s dismissal of the Does’ Fourth Amendment claim based on 
Woodard’s qualified immunity.96 The Tenth Circuit structured its 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment by first looking at qualified 
immunity and what it means for the law to be “clearly established,” and 
second, whether the special needs doctrine applies.97 
First, the Tenth Circuit decided that the lower court was correct in 
applying qualified immunity because there was no clearly established 
law regarding whether a warrant was needed to search I.B.98 The Does 
argued on appeal that qualified immunity should not apply because the 
law was, in fact, clearly established based on existing case law regarding 
whether a warrant was needed to search and photograph a child.99 
However, the Tenth Circuit addressed each case the Does cited and 
distinguished them from the facts at hand, reiterating the fact that 
“clearly established” law is particularized to the facts and cannot be 
“defined at a high level of generality.”100 The court also acknowledged 
the circuit split to emphasize the lack of clearly established law.101 
Next, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that the 
appellants failed to show why the special needs doctrine should not 
apply.102 The court noted that even if the special needs doctrine applied, 
it would need to satisfy the two-prong reasonableness test:103 (1) that the 
search was “justified at its inception”; and (2) that the search “was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances.”104 However, the 
appellants “offer[ed] almost no analysis to support their contention” that 
the search was unreasonable.105 Therefore, because the law was not 
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clearly established and the appellants failed to show that the special 
needs doctrine was inapplicable to I.B.’s case, the ruling of the lower 
court dismissing the Fourth Amendment claims under qualified 
immunity was affirmed.106 
Judge Briscoe dissented in part, arguing that the law the Does cited 
was sufficient to show the law was “clearly established” regarding the 
application of the special needs doctrine to the search of a child’s 
body.107 Judge Briscoe argued Dubbs v. Head Start108 and Safford 
Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding109 are factually similar enough 
to I.B.’s case to give Woodard notice that her actions were 
unconstitutional.110 She argues that because these cases held that searches 
by adults on school property without parental notification, consent, or 
presence were unconstitutional, the searches were sufficiently similar to 
put Woodard on notice that her actions were unconstitutional.111 
Additionally, Judge Briscoe argued even if the special needs doctrine 
applied, the search was still unreasonable because “the content of the 
suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion,” and there was ample 
time to obtain parental consent.112  Judge Briscoe would reverse and 
remand all Fourth Amendment holdings.113 
In Woodard, the Tenth Circuit’s holding is hinged on its finding 
that the Does failed to show “clearly established law that the special 
needs doctrine could not support the search in this case,” and also failed 
to show “that a warrant was clearly required.”114 The majority held that 
the need to obtain a warrant to search a suspected victim of child abuse 
was not clearly established because not “every reasonable official would 
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”115  In sum, the 
court notes it is possible that the special needs doctrine could have 
applied in this case, but it did not reach the doctrine’s applicability 
because Woodard was shielded by qualified immunity.116 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Woodard indicates that the 
circuit split over whether the special needs doctrine applies to searches of 
suspected victims of child abuse is becoming more problematic. The 
Tenth Circuit should block the special needs doctrine from applying as 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when 
searching suspected victims of child abuse. The special needs doctrine 
should not apply for three reasons: (1) the doctrine and its accompanying 
tests are too nuanced and complex for consistent application; (2) the 
consequences that could result from unconstitutional searches are severe, 
so all due process should be afforded; and (3) the doctrine could be 
abused. This Section also includes proposed legislation to “clearly 
establish” the law in this area.  Clarifying the law would prevent 
qualified immunity from shielding government employees and allow 
victims of unconstitutional searches to recover. 
A. The Special Needs Doctrine is too Complex and Ambiguous to Allow 
for Consistent Application 
The special needs doctrine should not be an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement when searching children for indicia 
of abuse because the doctrine is ambiguous, complex, and leads to 
inconsistent application and results. Courts have allowed the application 
of the special needs doctrine to a broad range of situations and 
locations.117 Further, if it does apply, the two-fold test to determine 
reasonableness offers little guidance for consistent application.118 This 
leaves ample room for advocacy but produces inconsistent results.119 
Again, when the law is not clearly established, qualified immunity will 
likely apply, and victims of unconstitutional searches cannot recover. 
Therefore, the law should be clarified to narrow the circumstances in 
which a “special need” is apparent; otherwise, the confusion will persist. 
When determining if the special needs doctrine applies, it is 
important to note that there is a bright-line rule that blocks its application 
                                                                                                             
 117 See supra notes 46-47. 
 118 Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1514.   
 119 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (finding the two-prong 
reasonableness test was satisfied when searching plaintiff’s office without his knowledge 
after complaints of sexual harassment); but see Stafford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
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when there is a strong law enforcement presence.120  The rule aims to 
prevent law enforcement officers from avoiding the warrant requirement 
by having social workers conduct warrantless searches under the 
protection of the special needs doctrine.  The warrant requirement would 
be eviscerated if law enforcement officers could gather evidence from 
the reports of social workers who are not required to obtain warrants as 
long as there is a “special need.”121 Therefore, if the primary purpose of 
the search is to gather evidence for law enforcement, the special needs 
doctrine cannot apply.122 
Bright-line rules seem as though they would be clear and 
straightforward; however, it is still difficult to determine whether a 
search of a suspected victim of child abuse will lead to excessive 
entanglement with law enforcement. In a situation where there may be an 
abusive parent, the potential for law enforcement entanglement will 
always be lurking in the background.  Further, determining the “primary” 
purpose from a series of reasons for conducting a search seems entirely 
subjective. A social worker may argue the primary purpose was for the 
protection of the child, a non-law-enforcement purpose. However, it 
could also be argued the search was conducted to aid law enforcement in 
arresting abusive parents, which would preclude the special needs 
doctrine from applying. Between the uncertainties in the seemingly broad 
application of the special needs doctrine, the difficulty identifying the 
level of law enforcement entanglement, and isolating the primary 
purpose of the search, the special needs doctrine should not apply to 
searches of suspected victims of child abuse. 
Even if the court determines the special needs doctrine applies, the 
test to determine reasonableness is also unclear. The test involves a two-
fold inquiry into whether the search was: (1) “justified at its inception” 
and (2) reasonably related to the circumstances for which the search was 
generated in the first place.123 The search is justified if there was reason 
to believe the search would turn up evidence124  and it is not “excessively 
intrusive in light of the . . . nature of the infraction.”125 
These factors are too broad, and the reasoning attorneys can proffer 
to prove the search was justified and reasonable in scope appear to be 
entirely subjective, which could lead to inconsistent application of the 
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test. The first prong, “justified at its inception,” is flawed because it 
focuses only on the mindset of the person conducting the search and 
whether they believed the search would turn up evidence. This is a 
problem because one person’s subjective belief that they are justified in 
conducting a search is sufficient, even if any other person would have 
thought the opposite. 
Other objective factors should also be considered when determining 
whether the search would turn up evidence.  For example, a bulge in the 
person’s pocket or an attempt to flee may be objective reasons to believe 
the search would turn up evidence. By involving objective evidence and 
not merely the mindset of the searcher, this allows for more concrete 
evidence suggesting the search would turn up evidence rather than post 
hoc justifications. 
In addressing the second prong, the law should clarify what it 
means to be “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex . . . and the 
nature of the infraction.” This standard is problematic because it leaves 
no guidelines for what is acceptable in light of these factors.  There is no 
way to know at what point a seemingly acceptable search crosses the line 
into “excessively intrusive.” The law should place more specific limits 
on the scope of the search, such as listing certain infractions that may 
warrant a bodily search or requiring that searches involving undressing 
must be conducted by a medical professional. Or perhaps after a certain 
age, a search should only be conducted by someone of the same sex.126 
By offering more tailored restrictions or examples of what an acceptable 
search looks like, it could help clarify what searches are reasonable in 
light of the age, sex, and nature of the infraction of the person to be 
searched. 
In essence, it is unclear when and how the special needs doctrine 
applies, which leads to inconsistencies in its application, as evidenced by 
the current circuit split. This creates further confusion and does the 
opposite of creating “clearly established” law. Therefore, the special 
needs doctrine should not be applied to caseworkers searching children’s 
bodies for indicia of abuse. 
B. The Potential Consequences for Searches of Suspected Victims of 
Child Abuse are Severe so Full Due Process Should be Afforded 
The special needs doctrine should not apply to warrantless searches 
of suspected victims of child abuse because the potential consequences 
of these searches could be severe. Therefore, full due process should be 
afforded by requiring a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant, 
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acting under parental consent, or acting under exigent circumstances. A 
search of this kind could result in one of two findings: the child is being 
abused, or the child is not being abused. Regardless of the outcome, the 
child has now experienced being stripped, inspected, sometimes touched, 
and sometimes photographed by a stranger.127 Parents now must explain 
to their child why a stranger was allowed to look at them, touch them, 
and photograph them while naked. Additionally, the parents could be at 
risk of losing custody rights, and now their children have to cope with 
being separated from their parents.128 With consequences this severe, the 
special needs doctrine should not be an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement. Rather, to afford sufficient 
constitutional protection, a caseworker should be required to show 
probable cause to obtain a warrant before conducting a search. 
The special needs doctrine should not apply in this context because 
the risk of a parent losing custody of their child is so high, that all due 
process should be afforded. As Justice Blackmun noted, “there can be 
few losses more grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”129  
Additionally, Justice Stephens wrote, “[a]lthough both deprivations [a 
prison sentence and termination of parental rights] are serious, often the 
deprivation of parental rights will be more grievous than the two . . . . 
[and] both deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law.”130   
After searching a child for signs of abuse, the possibility of both a 
child being removed from their parents and the parent being arrested are 
foreseeable consequences. This is traumatic for both parents and 
children.131 No matter the finding, children will likely suffer 
psychological harm from the invasiveness of these searches. For 
example, if the child was being abused, not only will they suffer 
psychological harm from the abuse, but this trauma can be exacerbated 
when they are removed from their home and their parents.132 However, 
                                                                                                             
 127 See Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019); Calabretta v. Floyd, 
189 F.3d 808, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory 
Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 128 See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 42, at 415–16. 
 129 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv’s, 452 U.S. 18, 40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 130 Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 131 “The first and most important point in the analysis is that the foreseeable 
consequence of child protection searches and seizures—removal of children from their 
parents and placement in state custody—is severe and of immense constitutional 
magnitude to both parents and children. It directly implicates fundamental constitutional 
rights of such a pedigree that they trigger many procedural protections.” Gupta-Kagan, 
supra note 18, at 422. 
 132 See Wendy Jennings, Separating Families Without Due Process: Hidden Child 
Removals Closer to Home, 22 CITY UNIV. N.Y. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019) (“research 
overwhelmingly demonstrates the harmful and emotionally damaging effects of removing 
children from their parents”); Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect 
122 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
even if the child was not suffering from abuse, the invasiveness of the 
search can still have lasting effects on the child’s psyche.133 
In order to protect parents and children in these situations, 
caseworkers should be required to obtain a warrant before conducting a 
search. To obtain a warrant, a judge must conclude there is enough 
evidence to support the probable cause that a child is being abused. 
Probable cause can be shown through witness statements or other 
evidence, however, suspicion or belief by itself is not sufficient.134 This 
is meant as a safeguard to prevent unconstitutional invasive searches 
from taking place when there is only a suspicion or belief of abuse. 
Rather, there must be enough evidence for a judge to decide that a child 
is possibly being abused. Even though the bar for probable cause is low, 
the procedural requirements to obtain a warrant still afford parents and 
children more due process than acting on suspicion alone. 
The other two exceptions to the warrant requirement previously 
mentioned (consent, and exigent circumstances) also contain inherent 
safeguards to afford adequate constitutional protections. Parental consent 
would afford full procedural protections because it would alert the parent 
to the accusations against them or others and allow for there to be 
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 134 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964). 
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consent, and even parental presence at these searches.135  Exigent 
circumstances are essentially emergency situations where action can be 
taken immediately because there is no time to obtain a warrant or 
consent.136 Given the seriousness of child abuse allegations, it could well 
be that there is an emergency situation which could result in harm to the 
child if action is not taken immediately. However, if the caseworker 
relies on exigent circumstances to uphold the search, they have the 
burden to prove that an exigent circumstance existed to justify their 
warrantless search.137 Proving exigent circumstances is a higher bar 
because the caseworker would need to show an emergency existed, 
rather than merely showing that obtaining a warrant was “impracticable,” 
which is required under the special needs doctrine. 
There are circumstances in which the special needs doctrine 
applies, and the court has upheld in other contexts the necessity of this 
additional exception; however, searches of a suspected victim of child 
abuse should not be included amongst these circumstances. The 
warrantless searches upheld under the special needs doctrine were 
materially different from the search of a suspected victim of child abuse 
because the consequences in the former cases were more temporary and 
minor. For example, being reprimanded at school for smoking in the 
bathroom138  or being fined for a housing code violation were 
consequences of a warrantless search under the special needs doctrine.139 
These consequences, while still injurious for the person being searched, 
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are not as severe or as permanent as the consequence of a child being 
removed from their home or suffering from lasting psychological harm. 
With an outcome this permanent and harsh, the special needs doctrine is 
an inappropriate exception to the warrant requirement in the context of 
searching the bodies of suspected victims of child abuse. Rather, full 
constitutional protections should be afforded either by obtaining a 
warrant, parental consent, or proving there was an exigent circumstance 
that allowed for immediate action. 
C. The Special Needs Doctrine Could Be Abused 
The special needs doctrine should not apply to searches of 
suspected victims of child abuse because it could allow for invasive 
searches to take place with no legal remedy. The person conducting the 
search could have multiple levels of protection from liability between the 
special needs doctrine’s exception to the warrant requirement, as well as 
qualified immunity (if they are a government employee).140 This could 
prevent those children who were subjected to invasive searches from 
obtaining a legal remedy.141 Further, it could allow for abuse of the 
special needs doctrine by permitting invasive searches with no legal 
repercussions for the investigator who has violated another’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. This is especially true when recognizing that many 
families would not have the resources to challenge government action 
through a civil suit, leaving government misconduct unchecked. 
There is potential for abuse of the special needs doctrine because 
people may continue to conduct invasive searches of children without 
obtaining a warrant as long as they can show after-the-fact that there was 
some “special need” that made obtaining a warrant impracticable. This is 
different from appearing before a judge to show probable cause for a 
warrant because explaining the “special need” can be a post hoc 
reasoning. Under the special needs doctrine, no judge is standing by to 
decide whether a special need exists before the search takes place. 
Rather, the special needs doctrine is only discussed if there is a resulting 
lawsuit, at which time the party who conducted the search can put forth 
an argument that they were acting under the special needs doctrine’s 
exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, this doctrine is not a 
procedural safeguard against unreasonable searches; but rather, it is a 
safety net for those who conducted the test to rely on in case they are 
sued. 
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If government employees continue to be protected both by the 
special needs doctrine and qualified immunity, due to the lack of clearly 
established law, then there are no legal repercussions. With no 
repercussions, this doctrine could be abused and become widely used as 
a way around the warrant requirement. Thus, the special needs doctrine 
should not apply to strip searches of children and social workers should 
be acting either under parental consent, exigent circumstances, or a 
warrant. 
D. Proposed Federal Legislation 
As previously noted, a large part of the issue surrounding 
caseworkers conducting warrantless searches of suspected victims of 
child abuse is the fact that the law is uncertain.  When the law is 
uncertain and not clearly established, qualified immunity applies to 
shield government employees, like caseworkers, from liability.142 This 
leaves victims of invasive searches with no remedy.  In order to prevent 
victims of invasive searches from being denied a remedy, the law needs 
to be clarified.  By clarifying the law, qualified immunity would not 
apply because the law would be clearly established. When qualified 
immunity is taken out of the picture, courts can move on to actually 
analyze the reasonableness of the search rather than dismissing lawsuits 
at the onset because of qualified immunity. 
There needs to be clear, straightforward legislation defining the 
scope of these searches so there is no issue over whether the law is 
“clearly established.” By creating clear legislation, caseworkers will have 
more straightforward guidelines on how to conduct a constitutional 
search. 
While there are federal statutes providing minimum standards for 
assessing and handling child maltreatment,143 each state is still 
responsible for setting its own guidelines and standards.144  Despite the 
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126 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
existence of federal and state guidelines, there is still significant 
confusion over the bounds of searches of suspected victims of child 
abuse, as evidenced by the circuit split. 
Therefore, this Comment proposes simplified legislation for states 
to adopt to clarify the law for caseworkers searching suspected victims of 
child abuse. First, the special needs doctrine should be prohibited from 
being applied as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement. Second, for caseworkers to inspect a child’s body and 
invade their privacy, the caseworker must obtain a warrant unless there is 
an exigent circumstance, or they obtain parental consent. Ideally, a 
caseworker will always obtain a warrant so that these searches cannot be 
conducted unless probable cause is shown. If there is truly no time for a 
warrant to be obtained, then an exigent circumstance is likely present, 
and the caseworker may take immediate action to protect a child from an 
emergency circumstance.145 Further, parental consent would also be a 
valid exception to the warrant requirement because it protects the privacy 
interests of both the parent and the child.146 
Once it has been determined that a search can take place, there 
should be clarifying guidelines for the caseworkers inspecting children’s 
bodies through either obtaining a warrant, obtaining parental consent, or 
acting under exigent circumstances  This Comment proposes clarifying 
guidelines, which are largely based on criteria the court considered in 
Darryl v. Coler from the Seventh Circuit.147 In Darryl, the Illinois 
Department of Children and Family Services Child Abuse and Neglect 
Investigation Decisions Handbook listed four options for a caseworker 
who deems a physical examination necessary: (1) require the caretaker to 
take the child to a physician for a physical examination; (2) take the child 
to a physician for a physical examination; (3) disrobe the child and 
conduct a cursory physical examination while the caretaker is present; or 
(4) permit the school nurse to examine the child.148 
Additionally, the Handbook had three supplementary restrictions: 
(1) in cases of sexual abuse, a physician shall conduct the examination; 
(2) an examination of a child over the age of thirteen must be conducted 
by a caseworker of the same sex; and (3) a severely ill child should 
immediately be seen by a physician.149 
                                                                                                             
federal statutes regarding child welfare, however the history and extent of these federal 
statues are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full discussion, see Id. at exhibits 3.1 
and 3.2. 
 145 See supra note 136. 
 146 See supra notes 132, 133. 
 147 Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 895–96 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 148 Id. at 896. 
 149 Id. 
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This list is helpful because it is concise, thorough, and easy to 
understand. These requirements protect the privacy interests of the child 
by often requiring the caretaker to be present and consent to the search. 
Additionally, this list pushes for a physician to conduct the search.  This 
is an important safeguard because a caseworker has little, if any, medical 
training, whereas medical professionals are trained in examining bodies 
and can form a medical diagnosis. Further, even young children 
understand doctors are one of the few people who are allowed to undress 
and inspect their body;150 therefore, the search is done in a more private 
and comfortable environment. 
While this list creates a strong starting point for proposed 
legislation, it could be modified. There could be a “step zero” where 
caseworkers must substantially verify the report of abuse or neglect 
before conducting a search. This preliminary investigation would require 
weighing the credibility of the source before taking action. Practically, 
this may require calling the child’s parents or talking to the child’s 
siblings, teachers, or friends to determine whether the allegation is 
supported by some evidence before diving into a full-scale search and 
investigation.151 While this does take time and resources, this additional 
safeguard is necessary to prevent unsubstantiated searches from taking 
place. Further, this information can be used to show probable cause when 
obtaining a warrant. 
Part of this “step zero” preliminary investigation should also 
require children to be briefly interviewed before a physical examination 
takes place. This would allow the child an opportunity to explain if they 
were being abused and direct the caseworker to specific parts of their 
body where they have been hurt. This could lead to a more limited and 
targeted search rather than asking the child to completely undress. 
Additionally, this opens a dialogue with the child where the caseworker 
could explain the search, why it is happening, and attempt to ease the 
mind of the child. 
Finally, there should be more emphasis on the age of the child.  For 
example, any child over the age of five (kindergarten-aged and above) 
should only be inspected by a person of the same sex, unless that person 
is a medical professional. School-aged children have a sense of personal 
autonomy and privacy over their bodies.152 Additionally, when 
                                                                                                             
 150 10 Ways to Teach Your Child the Skills to Prevent Child Abuse, FAM. & CHILD. 
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 151 See supra note 135. 
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determining if a search is reasonable, courts look to whether the search 
was appropriate in light of the age and sex of the child.153  Once the 
above guidelines have been met, and a body examination is warranted, 
this would be one additional safeguard to protect the privacy interests of 
children who are subjected to a visual body search. 
Below is a proposed statute that encompasses each of these 
concerns.  This statute could be included in state criminal codes 
concerning domestic abuse or sex offenses to outline the rights of the 
person being searched and the limits on the caseworker conducting the 
search.  It could also be published in policy handbooks and manuals for 
caseworkers in various state and federal departments who investigate 
child abuse. 
E. Conducting a Search of a Child who is a Suspected Victim of 
Child Abuse—Conditions for Removing Clothing: 
 
A) If a caseworker objectively believes a physical 
examination involving the removal of clothing of a 
minor is necessary to search the child’s body for indicia 
of abuse, the caseworker must: 
1) have a licensed medical professional conduct 
the examination;154 
2) require a caretaker, not alleged of abuse, to 
take the child to a physician for an 
examination;155 
i. a caretaker could include any adult 
family member or guardian, or 
ii. an adult of the child’s designation 
with whom they feel comfortable 
3) conduct the examination with a caretaker not 
alleged of abuse present;156 or 
i. if conducted by a caseworker, the 
caseworker must identify as the same 
gender as the child to conduct the 
search if the child is five years old or 
older.157 
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 155 See supra notes 135, 150. 
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4) permit the school nurse to perform the 
examination without others present unless the 
child so requests.158   
B) If the caseworker has reason to believe the child is a 
victim of sexual assault, the physical examination 
must: 
1) be conducted by a licensed medical 
professional;159 or 
2) be conducted by a school nurse without others 
present unless the child so requests.160 
C) Before an examination described in section A or B can 
take place, the caseworker must: 
3) take appropriate steps to verify the report of 
abuse or neglect to determine whether, 
objectively, the test is necessary.  Appropriate 
steps may include, but are not limited to: 
i. determining the identity of the person 
who provided the tip; 
ii. evaluating the credibility of the person 
who provided the tip; 
iii. speaking to the child’s teacher; 
iv. speaking to the child’s friends; or 
v. speaking to the child’s family 
members who are not alleged abusers 
4) speak with the child and ask them specifically 
about the allegations raised, including but not 
limited to: 
i.  asking the child if they have been 
touched inappropriately; 
ii.  asking the child to indicate where 
they have been touched or where their 
body    hurts to target specific areas to 
search; and 
iii. explain the reasons for the search, 
who will conduct the search, and why 
the search is taking place. 
 
In sum, the privacy interests of children will be best protected if the 
special needs doctrine is inapplicable to searches of suspected victims of 
child abuse. This would require caseworkers to obtain a warrant unless 
they have received parental consent or are operating under an exigent 
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circumstance. Once this hurdle has been passed to allow for a search, a 
clear, brief, and thorough list of guidelines for caseworkers can help 
protect the privacy interests of the child. By adopting more 
straightforward guidelines, it creates “clearly established” law. Clearly 
established law can prevent caseworkers from being shielded by 
qualified immunity because if their actions objectively violate clearly 
established law, they will be held responsible. Additionally, by clarifying 
the law and proposing this more straightforward legislation, it could help 
end the uncertainty perpetuating this circuit split. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that qualified immunity 
applied because the law was not clearly defined. However, the Tenth 
Circuit should follow the growing trend in the circuit split to prevent the 
special needs doctrine from applying to searches of suspected victims of 
child abuse. The law should not allow the special needs doctrine to apply 
because the tests and applications are too vague to produce consistent 
results, the consequences of these searches can be severe so full due 
process should be warranted, and the doctrine could be abused. Further, 
the law should be clarified to prevent the special needs doctrine from 
being applied, and guidelines for caseworkers need to be more 
straightforward to sufficiently clarify the law.  Doing so will best protect 
the privacy interests of suspected victims of child abuse. 
 
